“At around 8 pm, we heard the sound of aircraft circling overhead for a short period before the noise faded away. At approximately 1 in the morning, an airborne operation took place involving a helicopter (Apache), from which American soldiers were deployed. The helicopter descended to a low altitude near the home of Sheikh Abdelraouf Al-Dahab, and the soldiers stormed the house. We heard gunfire that continued until dawn, while Apache helicopters remained hovering overhead. Anyone who attempted to flee the house or neighboring homes was targeted by the aircraft. Even women and children who tried to escape were killed.”
— Testament of a local resident who witnessed the US raid on Yakla, Al-Bayda, in 2017.
With its central location bordering eight other governorates, Al Bayda is considered one of Yemen’s most important regions. It was on the frontline between North and South Yemen prior to unification in 1990. Its predominantly Shafi’i (Sunni) population had a history of conflict with Zaydi states from the north until the 1962 revolution against the Zaydi Imams, in which the people of Al-Bayda played a decisive role. Today, many of its residents view the Houthis as an extension of those Zaydi states. The Houthis, in turn, made the governorate one of their first targets for expansion after seizing control of Sana’a in September 2014, under the pretext of protecting civilians from Al-Qaeda. Areas of the governorate were subjected to siege, displacement, and shelling. Conflict between the Houthis and the governorate’s residents continues to the present, despite the disparity in arms. The Houthis hold an advantage in numbers, weaponry, and financial and logistical support over the local tribal forces they encounter, whom they routinely brand as terrorists. The stigma of association with Al-Qaeda provided the Houthis with a pretext for invasion, occupation, and repression, and the group’s presence has drawn US airstrikes. Even though it no longer has a serious footprint in the governorate, Al-Bayda still pays a price for the association with Al Qaeda.
The Al-Dahab Legacy: Family Feuds and Ties to Al Qaeda
For the citizens of Al-Bayda, their initial encounters with Al-Qaeda were limited to an internal conflict in the Al-Dahab family. Three siblings, Tareq, Nabil, and Qaid, were considered to be affiliated with the organization and waged a struggle against their older brother, tribal sheikh and parliamentarian Ali al-Dahab. They claimed he had usurped their rights after their father’s death. Ali expelled Tareq and his brothers, who relocated to Sana’a.
Tareq eventually joined Al-Qaeda. His brother-in-law was Yemeni-American Anwar al-Awlaqi, whom he had met in the Political Security Prison in Sana’a sometime between 2006 and 2007. In early 2012, the two led Al Qaeda forces to seize the city of Rada’a in Al Bayda. The forces pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri as Al-Qaeda’s international leader, and to Tareq as Emir of Rada’a.
Tareq gained social standing outside Al-Qaeda for his perceived even-handedness in resolving local conflicts. Tribes would come to him to arbitrate their disputes, as he was known for ruling in favor of the rightful party and for refusing bribes or fees for his services. Tareq himself withdrew from the city following tribal mediation and an eventual deal with the state. An agreement was reached for a withdrawal to Al-Manaseh— Tareq’s village in the northwest Wald Rabi’ district—in exchange for the release of Nabil al-Dahab, Tareq’s brother, from a prison run by the Political Security Organization.
In 2012, Tareq withdrew to his village, but was killed by another brother, Hizam, just a few days later. Tareq’s supporters in Al-Qaeda, in turn, killed Hizam, who was accused of acting on behalf of the state. The organization controlled the northwest Al-Manaseh area for months before withdrawing through another round of tribal mediation. But the stigma of being linked to Al-Qaeda was now attached to the whole Al Dahab family, even those who were not members of the organization. Another brother, Abdelraouf al-Dahab, was appointed sheikh of the Wald Rabi’ district and dealt with official authorities, even meeting with then-President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Abderaouf fought alongside the Yemeni government against the Houthis and worked with popular resistance groups coordinating with the government to form military brigades aimed at liberating Rada’a and Al-Bayda. As a result of increasing tribal pressure, elements of Al-Qaeda withdrew to the Yakla area, bordering Marib.
The instability and tension wrought by tribal-familial conflict and Al-Qaeda activity paved the way for the Houthis to take control of the governorate in October 2014. The group committed violations aimed at subjugating the tribes and humiliating their leaders. The Houthis publicly executed four sheikhs from the Al-Omar tribe in the southern Dhi Na’im district in 2016. Many people were arrested and killed, some tortured to death in Houthi custody.
Some fighters from Al-Qaeda supported the tribes in their battle against the Houthis after 2014, but the group no longer posed a serious threat as a coherent force. Instead, it became a dangerous liability. The threat now was the American bombing of Al-Qaeda elements located in residential areas. For years, Al-Bayda was a theater of US drone strikes and air operations. Citizens repeatedly sought tribal mediation to secure the withdrawal of Al-Qaeda elements from their areas, and the group typically complied.
Some have interpreted American operations against Al Qaeda in the governorate as providing a service to the Houthis, as airstrikes on members of Al-Qaeda facilitated their rapid takeover of areas of the governorate. One raid involved 30 American personnel transported by Apache helicopters to the village of Yakla, in the northwest of Al-Bayda Governorate, on January 29, 2017. The operation resulted in the deaths of around 25 people, among them women and children. The exact number of Al Qaeda members among them remains unknown. The operation reinforced the prevailing narrative portraying the area as a hub for terrorism. The Houthis continued to extend their reach, and by 2021, the group announced the elimination of Al-Qaeda elements and its complete control over the governorate.
An Unrelenting Houthi Campaign of Violence on Al-Bayda Residents
The relationship between the Houthis and the residents of Al-Bayda has been characterized by explicit or latent hostility and a lack of trust, with repeated bouts of severe oppression and violence against the local population. Fighting has been recurrent since the Houthis moved in in 2014, and has continued under their occupation, with many villages in multiple rounds of confrontation and violence. The Houthis routinely destroy the homes of their opponents in Al-Bayda as a form of collective punishment. Instances have been recorded in the Al-Hufrah neighborhood in Rada’a, the villages of Hankat al-Masoud, Khubza, Hammat Sarar, and Al-Zaub in Qaifah, and Al-Humayqan in Al-Zahir district. By 2020, the Houthis had blown up approximately 816 homes, 124 of which were in the Al-Bayda governorate. Notably, such actions have continued after the Houthis announced their elimination of Al-Qaeda in Al-Bayda and their assumption of full control over the governorate in September 2021. Though the Houthis initially justified their military expansion in Al-Bayda under the pretext of counterterrorism, their use of repressive violence continues in the absence of Al-Qaeda activity.
Between 2014 and 2017, 350 families were displaced from the northwest village of Al-Zaub due to a Houthi siege. The most severe fighting took place in June 2015, which led to the displacement of most of the village’s residents, with further fighting in March 2016 and September 2020. Residents had tried to prevent Houthi fighters from using the road passing through their village during the group’s advance into Al-Bayda. Indiscriminate bombardment damaged water tanks, wells, communication networks, and electricity lines. Civilians—particularly women and children—were prevented from evacuating to receive medical attention. Homes, shops, and vehicles were looted or blown up, and medical supplies were stolen from the area’s only hospital. Fuel tankers were burned, and qat farms were destroyed. Twenty-nine civilians were killed, and 100 were kidnapped or detained. Tribal mediation led to an agreement under which the Houthis would withdraw in exchange for villagers halting their resistance activities. However, the Houthis violated the agreement two years later, shelling homes and storming the village with tanks.
The Houthis blew up most of the houses in Khubza in 2014 during their expansion into Al-Bayda. Around 200 families were displaced from the village, and an agreement was reached that the Houthis would not enter the village. However, in July 2022, the Houthis claimed that three of their fighters were killed at a security checkpoint near the village and imposed a siege preventing entry or exit. Seventeen civilians were killed, and several homes were burned. The Houthis also accused the village residents of harboring foreign fighters, though there is no evidence that any were present. In early 2025, Houthi forces requested permission to pass through the village to go to another area. Once inside, they imposed a comprehensive siege under the pretext of “searching for fugitives.”
Oppressive and arbitrary Houthi rule has bred further conflict. In 2023, a relative of a Houthi supervisor killed Saif al-Zaylai in the Al-Hufrah neighborhood of Rada’a, reportedly over a dispute over qat taxes. Al-Zaylai was a qat seller in the Souq Uraybe qat market, west of Rada’a, and had refused to pay. The family pursued the case, finding support from the neighborhood aqil, Ali Tawfiq Naqqous, and local residents. But after a year, there was still no progress toward justice. The victim’s brother saw his killer passing in an armed Houthi vehicle, and opened fire, killing him. He then fled the neighborhood. The Houthis, after trying and failing to find him, decided to blow up his house. The explosion caused neighboring houses to collapse, killing 20 civilians. Amidst local and international outcry, the Houthi leadership claimed that what happened was an isolated incident and promised an investigation. Naqqous and local residents continue to pay a price for their stance, as the Houthis routinely provoke the neighborhood’s residents, fabricate pretexts for confrontation, and engage them in violent clashes that have resulted in several casualties. At present, Naqqous and a group of neighborhood youths are detained in the Political Security prison in Al-Bayda.
In Hanakat al-Masoud, fighting erupted in January 2025 when the Houthis tightened their control over the village. Using tanks and drones, the Houthis cut off communications for days, looted private property, and demolished several homes via shelling. They killed approximately 15 civilians and conducted a massive arrest campaign targeting nearly 400 people, more than 60 of whom remain detained in Sana’a. The Houthis claimed that the residents had prevented them from taking custody of fugitives, while sources in the village said they were demanding the implementation of a prosecution order to release the five men.
In the northwest village of Hammat Sarar, homes were demolished and artesian wells destroyed in initial fighting in 2015. In August 2024, Houthi gunmen killed two young men from the village of Hammat Sarar. The villagers pursued the killers in an attempt to retaliate, killing approximately four of the group’s fighters. In turn, the Houthis brought in tanks and armored vehicles, tightening their siege around the village and demanding the handover of those accused of killing its members. The siege was not lifted until village elders were handed over as hostages through tribal mediation.
The Houthis have prevented relief organizations from reaching areas opposed to their rule, and have disempowered local officials. Public officials are treated with suspicion[1] and paid lower salaries than their counterparts elsewhere.[2] They have imposed additional taxes[3] on agricultural crops such as qat, residents’ most important source of income. They have also imposed disproportionate fees on government offices – the Health Office in Al Bayda pays monthly fees to the Ministry in Sana’a that are four times higher than those paid by Dhamar.[4]
The Price of Stigma
Citizens see no explanation for these discriminatory practices other than collective punishment. Al-Bayda has one of the lowest recruitment rates into the Houthi ranks of the northern governorates, and continues to resist the administration of Houthi supervisors. Consequently, the Houthis have continued to try to link the citizens of Al-Bayda to terrorism whenever conflict erupts. This is perhaps an attempt to create political cover, though international organizations have condemned the violence against civilians, stating that it may amount to war crimes. Locally, this narrative has helped the Houthis neutralize tribes in Al-Bayda, preventing them from garnering support from villages, who fear being accused of supporting terrorism. It may also have facilitated the mobilization of tribal fighters to support the Houthis under the pretext of counterterrorism.
The relationship between the Houthis and the citizens of Al-Bayda remains characterized by mistrust and animosity. It is an equation the Houthis have sought to change through subjugation and violence, while citizens combat these efforts with their own arms. But the balance of power is in the Houthis’ favor, and whatever loss of popularity the group incurs due to its use of excessive violence, its use of heavy weapons, sieges, and home demolitions has been decisive. Despite the national and international condemnation of Houthi practices in Al-Bayda, residents fear that the stigma of terrorism and the violence that accompanies it will stick with them.
This publication was produced as part of the second phase of the Yemen Peace Forum (YPF), a Sana’a Center initiative that seeks to empower the next generation of Yemeni youth and civil society activists to engage in critical national issues. The YPF is funded by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.