Since 2016, bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have experienced periods of acute tension in Yemen. Previously, these tensions never went past managed competition. Both states preserved areas of joint cooperation, avoided crossing one another’s red lines, and kept open lines of dialogue following every round of escalation or attempt to assert influence in Yemen.
However, the events of the past two months in southern Yemen represent an unprecedented turning point in the relationship, with a shift toward an overt rivalry that has brought an official end to the Saudi-Emirati coalition in Yemen and catalyzed a new cycle of regional conflict.
Over the last decade, relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE were shaped by three factors: shared threats, a recognition of regional standing, and ambitious economic, social, and technological development models. The third factor rendered the relationship between the two states permanently competitive, while the first and second factors determined whether such competition would be cooperative or confrontational.
In 2011, Riyadh redefined its national security threats to confront the geopolitical vacuum resulting from the collapse of Arab regimes, curb the expansion of political Islam led by Turkey and Qatar, and deter the network of political Shia proxies led by Iran. This aligned perfectly with Abu Dhabi’s perception of its own threats.
In 2015, a new leadership emerged in Saudi Arabia, bringing the Kingdom closer to Abu Dhabi through shared priorities of economic and social modernization and new national governance models. This strengthened the bilateral relationship along a new axis: the UAE expressed a willingness to engage further in Saudi Arabia’s aggressive regional approach, both in the Yemen war and later in the decision to boycott Qatar. In return, Abu Dhabi sought Saudi recognition of its status as an equal partner in regional affairs. Yemen served as the first test of this approach through the joint command of the Arab Coalition’s forces.
However, the strategic partnership was never fully realized. To the extent that it did operate, it was punctuated by numerous disagreements, particularly in Yemen. As the Saudi modernization project under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman accelerated, competition with the UAE intensified.
The period from 2020 to 2024 witnessed the undermining of many of the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s foundations. The two states’ perceptions of their respective threats were no longer aligned, and it became clear that Abu Dhabi’s expectations of an equal partnership would not be met. Saudi Arabia began acting unilaterally on several fronts, expecting the UAE to fall in line and follow suit on matters such as the Yemen roadmap, reconciliation with Iran and Qatar, and efforts to raise oil prices via OPEC.
Nevertheless, the coalition persisted in a minimal and formal capacity for two reasons. First, both parties needed to deter Iran, particularly in Yemen; and second, the partnership became increasingly important to the UAE as a cover for its own regional activities and for expanding its geopolitical influence. The coalition’s cover gave Abu Dhabi a powerful excuse for plausible deniability of its local allies’ actions.
By 2025, however, the gap between the two countries had widened significantly. The weakening of the Iranian regime meant deterring Tehran was no longer at the forefront of Saudi priorities. Instead, Riyadh invested diplomatically to ensure the success of nuclear negotiations and forestall military strikes against the regime. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, increasingly saw Israel as a growing strategic challenge and began working to curb its hegemony. This, in turn, has inevitably undermined the trajectory of the Abraham Accords, which the UAE had bet on as a central pillar in the construction of a new regional security architecture in which it sought to play a leading role. Finally, Saudi Arabia and Egypt became concerned about Emirati involvement in Sudan, and the two began working to curb Emirati influence as much as possible. This was made evident during Bin Salman’s visit to Washington, where he urged Trump to exert pressure to end the war in Sudan.
In other words, Saudi Arabia and the UAE no longer disagreed merely over the identification of mutual threats. They had come to view the other’s expanding regional influence as a strategic obstacle and threat. This partially explains the motives behind the UAE’s adoption of a high-risk regional policy, which first manifested in Sudan and then reached its peak in southern Yemen.
Abu Dhabi’s Yemen Gambit
In December 2025, the UAE began a game of geopolitical roulette. This meant either proactively expanding its influence in order to assert itself as a major regional player or losing its geopolitical assets and facing political isolation. Simply put, Abu Dhabi would either emerge as a winner or accelerate losses that it feared would occur sooner or later.
But the high-risk Emirati approach backfired, catalyzing a coordinated regional response from Riyadh, Muscat, and Cairo to undermine Emirati influence in Yemen. At the same time, it has triggered a more aggressive Saudi policy in the Horn of Africa and Libya.
Abu Dhabi has lost its role as a major player in Yemen, but it is still an influential power. Three regional factors will determine Abu Dhabi’s new approach to Yemen, and whether it leans toward adaptation or shifts toward a war of attrition.
First, there is the regional balance of power. If internal and external pressures on the Iranian regime increase and its regional influence erodes, Abu Dhabi will likely become more committed to playing a major role in the region within a new axis based on the Abraham Accords. The reverse here is also true. If Washington and Tehran return to the diplomatic track, and the likelihood of regime collapse in Iran or its exposure to a decisive strike recedes, the UAE would be more inclined to abandon its ambitions for a regional order anchored in the Abraham Accords.
A second factor regards the scope of Saudi efforts in Libya, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. Depending on the extent of Saudi Arabia’s ability to threaten Emirati geopolitical assets, Abu Dhabi may feel forced to confront any Saudi policy. The UAE might attempt to leverage its influence in Yemen as a counterbalance to Saudi pressure in Africa.
A final factor concerns international or regional mediation. External actors could intervene to reduce hostilities between the two sides and facilitate a resumption of dialogue. Cairo and Washington remain the most suitable candidates to play such a role.
Until then, Saudi Arabia will treat any escalation in Yemen’s south as an Emirati escalation. Riyadh believes that stripping the UAE of its veil of plausible deniability is the only way to restrain it from investing in a campaign of attrition against the Saudi-backed government.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen’s Peace in the Regional Landscape program. The series seeks to bolster peacebuilding efforts in Yemen by strategically examining the country’s security and economic ties with the broader Gulf and Red Sea region.